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Johnnie Cochran, Robert Shapiro, and F. Lee Bailey all became famous 
as criminal defense attorneys. Television dramas depicting the high-stakes 
world of criminal trials, focusing on charismatic lawyers winning difficult 
cases, continue to captivate audiences around the country.1 Outside of the 
bright lights of Hollywood, however, the protagonists of these courtroom 
dramas often play little role at trial. Instead, when faced with the complexi-
ties and uncertainty of criminal trials, an increasingly large number of 
defendants choose to forgo the assistance of a lawyer.2 While defendants’ 
reasons for representing themselves are as varied as the charges levied 
against them, doing so consistently creates headaches for all parties 
involved.3 And where a pro se defendant’s behavior at trial raises questions 
about his competence, these headaches can quickly become more serious.  
This Comment examines the situation in which a pro se defendant’s be-
havior raises questions about his own competence during trial. Is this 
defendant, otherwise proceeding pro se, required to have the assistance of 
counsel at his own competency hearing? Every federal court of appeals to 
consider this question has answered in the affirmative and has held that 
failing to provide such assistance is constitutional error.4 However, the 
courts of appeals are split in deciding the proper remedy for this error. This 
Comment argues that by examining the different remedies courts have used 
from contractual, practical, and behavioral perspectives, granting an automatic 
reversal emerges as the best option available. When the lights go out and 
 
† Senior Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2012, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to my family and 
friends for their unwavering patience and support. All errors herein are my own.  
1 See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, The 25 Greatest Legal TV Shows, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 
2009, 11:50 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_25_greatest_legal_tv_shows/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/H63E-ZZW8 (“From Perry Mason to Leland McKenzie, Jack McCoy 
to Patty Hewes, lawyers have been among the most durable and popular characters on the small 
screen.”).  
2 See Michael W. Loudenslager, Giving Up the Ghost: A Proposal for Dealing with Attorney 
“Ghostwriting” of Pro Se Litigants’ Court Documents Through Explicit Rules Requiring Disclosure and 
Allowing Limited Appearances for Such Attorneys, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 107 (2008) 
(“Courts . . . have experienced significant growth in the number of pro se litigants appearing 
before them in recent years.”).  
3 See Paula J. Frederick, Learning to Live with Pro Se Opponents, GPSOLO, Oct.–Nov. 2005, at 
48, 50 (“Unfortunately, from a lawyer’s perspective, opposing a pro se litigant often means 
additional headaches.”).  
4 See infra Part II.  
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the television cameras are gone, a bit of pro se paternalism may preserve the 
liberty and save the lives of defendants facing trial on their own. 
In Part I, this Comment explains the origin of the right to counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment. After tracing the right’s history and rationale, the 
concept of a “critical stage”—a stage of a criminal proceeding in which the 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are implicated—is examined more 
closely. In Part II, this Comment discusses whether a defendant’s compe-
tency hearing should be characterized as a “critical stage.” After explaining 
that every court of appeals to consider the question has answered it in the 
affirmative, the Comment turns to the issue of the appropriate remedy for 
the deprivation of counsel at a competency hearing. Part III examines the 
current circuit split over the proper remedy for a competency-stage depriva-
tion and uses two courts of appeals cases to demonstrate the different 
remedy decisions courts have made. Part IV provides affirmative justifica-
tions for choosing automatic reversal to remedy competency-stage depriva-
tions. Finally, Part V acknowledges and responds to potential criticisms of 
automatic reversals in the competency hearing context.  
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
To someone unfamiliar with the U.S. Constitution, the idea that a court 
would provide a defendant with representation seems strange. Indeed, in 
the criminal context, the government itself is the adversary in court seeking 
to deprive the defendant of his liberty. Therefore, a historical background of 
the right to counsel and related concepts is necessary before one can 
understand the more nuanced context of competency stage deprivations.  
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”5 The Supreme Court has traditionally provided two justifications 
for this right.6 First, by providing counsel to criminal defendants, the 
imbalance between the accused and the government within our adversarial 
system is minimized.7 Second, and relatedly, providing counsel preserves 
 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Also guaranteed within the amendment are the defendant’s rights 
to a speedy and public trial, to an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to confront the witnesses against him, and to have compulsory process in 
obtaining witnesses in his favor. Id. 
6 See Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of A Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a Mere 
“Prophylactic Rule,” 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (explaining the two related goals of the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel). 
7 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (“The presence of counsel . . . operates 
to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of 
criminal prosecution.” (citation omitted)); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The 
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the fairness and integrity of criminal trials.8 These justifications recognize 
“the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional 
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with [the] 
power to take his life or liberty.”9 Because the American criminal justice 
system is so complex, the Sixth Amendment is designed to protect the 
layperson who may be unable to navigate effectively his or her defense 
alone.10 With the defendant facing such high stakes, and being systematically 
disadvantaged by a complicated system, the right to counsel is the Constitu-
tion’s chosen means to achieve some degree of parity at trial.11  
A. Extension of the Right to Counsel to “Critical Stages” 
Today, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at all “critical 
stages” of a criminal proceeding.12 The original understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment’s protections, however, focused almost exclusively on the 
criminal trial itself. After all, pretrial proceedings at the time of the Framers 
“were insignificant.”13 But the changing nature of these proceedings over 
time made it apparent that threats to the fairness and integrity of the 
 
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel.”). 
8 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1985) (“The right to the assistance of coun-
sel . . . is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.”); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right 
to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability 
of the adversarial system to produce just results.”). 
9 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). 
10 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (“Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law.”); see also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) 
(explaining that a layman’s assertion of his rights “often depends upon legal advice from someone 
who is trained and skilled in the subject matter”); Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow’s Massiah: 
Towards A “Prosecution Specific” Understanding of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 134, 134 (2004) (“The primary purpose of [the Sixth Amendment] is to help the layman 
when confronted with the inherent complexity of the American system of criminal law.” (citing 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69)).  
11 See James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 
71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980 (1986) (“Approximate parity between the[] combatants is critical to 
prevent unfair processes and unjust outcomes tainted by one side’s superiority.”).  
12 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (citations omitted); Iowa v. Tovar, 
541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004) (citations omitted); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted); Wade, 
388 U.S. at 224.  
13 Tomkovicz, supra note 11, at 982; see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) 
(“[T]he core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial, when the accused 
was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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criminal justice system were no longer limited to the trial itself.14 The 
“changing patterns of criminal procedure” meant that pretrial events came 
to resemble trial more closely, and the accused was being “confronted, just 
as at trial, by the procedural system” much earlier than he was previously.15 
To account for this change, the Supreme Court began to expand the scope 
of Sixth Amendment protections to pretrial proceedings. As the Wade 
Court explained,  
When the Bill of Rights was adopted . . . . [t]he accused confronted the 
prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, 
largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today’s law enforcement machinery 
involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial 
proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and 
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of 
modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee to . . . encompass[] counsel’s assistance whenev-
er necessary to assure a meaningful “defence.”16 
A series of cases during the 1960s and 1970s further clarified this con-
trast and highlighted the importance of representation at stages other than 
the trial.17 The circumstances of these cases led to the development of what is 
now identified as the critical stage doctrine, which expanded the scope of 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee and the remedies for its violation. By the 
time the Court penned its seminal critical stage opinion in United States v. 
Cronic,18 a completely new Sixth Amendment analysis replaced the original 
understandings of the guarantee.  
The Supreme Court’s development of the critical stage doctrine began 
in Hamilton v. Alabama.19 There, the defendant was not represented by 
 
14 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (identifying the period between a defendant’s arraignment and 
his trial as “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings”).  
15 Ash, 413 U.S. at 310. 
16 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-25.  
17 See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (finding that a defendant was entitled 
to the aid of counsel at a nonmandatory preliminary hearing); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201, 205-06 (1964) (holding that introducing into evidence incriminating statements obtained 
postindictment in the absence of defense counsel violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing a conviction because 
defendant was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing where he pleaded guilty); 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961) (holding that the absence of counsel at defendant’s 
arraignment mandated reversal, whether or not prejudice resulted).  
18 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  
19 368 U.S. 52 (1961); see also Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
the Court’s nationwide critical stage doctrine began in Hamilton).  
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counsel during his arraignment and was subsequently sentenced to death.20 
The Court explained that “[w]hatever may be the function and importance 
of arraignment in other jurisdictions, we have said enough to show that in 
Alabama it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. What happens there 
may affect the whole trial.”21 Because the arraignment was a “critical stage,” 
the Court refused to “stop to determine whether prejudice resulted.”22 
Rather, a defense may have been “irretrievably lost” due to the absence of 
counsel, so the defendant was not required to prove that he actually suffered 
a disadvantage.23 The Court unanimously reversed the Alabama Supreme 
Court’s denial of the defendant’s writ of error coram nobis, and the term 
“critical stage” entered Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.24 
 It was not long before the Court identified other “critical stages.” In a 
per curiam opinion, the Court in White v. Maryland applied Hamilton to 
identify a Maryland preliminary hearing as a critical stage where the right 
to counsel attaches.25 One year later, in Massiah v. United States, the Court 
found it impermissible to use a defendant’s “incriminating words” against 
him at trial, because “federal agents had deliberately elicited [the words] 
from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”26 
Because counsel presumably would have objected or guided the defendant 
toward a more favorable result, evidence acquired without counsel should 
never have been admitted.27 The expansion continued in United States v. 
Wade, where the Supreme Court held that a postindictment, pretrial lineup 
constituted a critical stage where counsel is necessary.28 And in Mempa v. 
Rhay, the Court found a defendant’s deferred sentencing hearing to be a 
critical stage.29 Finally, in Holloway v. Arkansas, Justice Berger’s opinion 
emphasized that the “mere physical presence” of counsel does not 
automatically amount to the representation guaranteed by the Sixth 
 
20 Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 52-53.  
21 Id. at 54. 
22 Id. at 55.  
23 Id. at 54-55.  
24 Id. at 53, 55. 
25 373 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963) (per curiam) (noting that “[o]nly the presence of counsel could 
have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently” 
(quoting Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 55) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
26 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
27 Id. at 204, 206 (recognizing that “a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of 
counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by 
the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding”).  
28 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (explaining that there is “grave potential for prejudice” in a 
pretrial lineup and that the “presence of counsel itself can often avert [such] prejudice”).  
29 389 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1967) (raising concerns that certain legal rights, such as the right to 
appeal, could be lost if not properly exercised at this stage). 
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Amendment.30 Because the trial court compelled the defense attorney in the 
case to jointly represent at trial three different defendants with conflicting 
interests, it had effectively “sealed his lips on crucial matters.”31 The Court 
concluded that the defense attorney’s physical presence, burdened by 
“conflicting obligations,” was analogous to a complete absence of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.32 After Holloway, critical stages encom-
passed a full range of confrontations from pretrial to sentencing, whether 
counsel was physically present or not. 
One entire category of nontrial proceedings—a category particularly 
relevant to this Comment—was notably absent from the Supreme Court’s 
two-decade expansion of the critical stage doctrine: mental health determi-
nations. But, in Estelle v. Smith,33 the Court offered its first definitive 
guidance on the subject. There, a doctor who examined the defendant 
before trial was not included on the State’s expected witness list.34 At the 
penalty phase, however, the doctor was called as a witness—over defense 
counsel’s objection—to testify regarding the defendant’s mental health.35 In 
his testimony, which “was based on information derived from his 90-minute 
‘mental status examination,’” the doctor claimed that the defendant presented 
a continuing danger to the community.36 After this testimony—which was 
the only testimony presented by the State—the jury sentenced the defend-
ant to death.37  
The Estelle Court found that the defendant’s “Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel clearly had attached when [the doctor] examined him at the Dallas 
County Jail, and their interview proved to be a ‘critical stage’ of the aggre-
gate proceedings against respondent.”38 Because the “defendant should not 
be forced to resolve such an important issue without ‘the guiding hand of 
counsel,’” the Court found that the “psychiatric examination . . . proceeded 
in violation of respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of 
counsel.”39 Importantly, Estelle dealt only with a defendant’s consent to a 
mental health interview, not the actual interview itself. But the lesson 
 
30 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978).  
31 Id. at 490.  
32 Id. at 489-90.  
33 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
34 Id. at 459.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 459-60.  
37 Id. at 460.  
38 Id. at 470 (citations omitted).  
39 Id. at 471 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).  
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remained that where an event proved to be critical to the aggregate proceeding, 
a conviction secured without counsel would not stand. 
B. Cronic: When “Being There” Is Not Enough 
While the Supreme Court’s two-decade development of critical stage 
doctrine greatly expanded the realm of possible Sixth Amendment viola-
tions, deprivations during these stages lacked their own, distinct method of 
analysis. Certain critical stage violations were held to be prejudicial per se, 
while others were analyzed under the “harmless error” standard.40 In 1984, 
however, the Supreme Court addressed this lack of uniformity in United 
States v. Cronic.41 The decision provided an exception to the prejudice 
requirement of ineffective assistance claims where circumstances exist “that 
are so likely to prejudice the accused” that even litigating over their effect 
would be “unjustified.”42  
In Cronic, the defendant was indicted for mail fraud following a nearly 
five-year federal investigation.43 After his retained counsel withdrew, the 
court appointed an inexperienced attorney with a real estate practice to 
represent him only twenty-five days before trial.44 The defendant was 
convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.45 But the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction after finding that the 
defendant “did not have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence that is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.”46 According to 
the Supreme Court,  
 
40 Compare United States v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 1969) (“It is not necessary that 
this Court determine whether defendant was prejudiced in fact, but only that he was ‘exposed to a 
reasonable possibility of prejudice in fact.’” (citation omitted)), with In re Di Bella, 518 F.2d 955, 
959 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Despite the broad language of such cases as Hamilton v. Alabama, the absence 
of counsel at a ‘critical stage’ of a proceeding does not always require a finding of prejudice per se. 
In some instances, the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California is applicable.” (citations 
omitted)). For an articulation of the harmless error rule, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to 
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
41 466 U.S. 648 (1984).  
42 Id. at 658; see also Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 (2008) (per curiam) (“Cronic 
‘recognized a narrow exception to Strickland’s holding that a defendant who asserts ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate not only that his attorney’s performance was deficient, but 
also that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’” (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 
(2004))). 
43 466 U.S. at 649.  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 649-50.  
46 Id. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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[t]his conclusion was not supported by a determination that respondent’s 
trial counsel had made any specified errors, that his actual performance had 
prejudiced the defense, or that he failed to exercise “the skill, judgment, and 
diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney”; instead the conclu-
sion rested on the premise that no such showing is necessary “when circum-
stances hamper a given lawyer’s preparation of a defendant’s case.”47  
The Tenth Circuit found that ineffectiveness could be inferred from, among 
other factors, the lawyer’s lack of experience and preparation time when 
compared to the complexity of the case.48 However, a unanimous Supreme 
Court reversed.49 In considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
the Court explained, a lawyer’s actual conduct and “specific errors” must be 
considered.50 
However, Cronic is better known for articulating the exceptions to this 
rule. The Court stated that demonstrating specific errors (“specificity”) 
would not be necessary where “surrounding circumstances justify a 
presumption of ineffectiveness.”51 Under these circumstances, a “Sixth 
Amendment claim [would] be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual 
performance.”52 Far from providing a broad exception, the only types of 
circumstances that could justify this exception were limited to those “so 
likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a 
particular case [would be] unjustified.”53 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stevens provided three circumstances that would satisfy this exception.54 
First, the complete denial of counsel would per se violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee.55 Second, counsel’s total failure “to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” would be “a denial of 
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presump-
tively unreliable.”56 Finally, a Sixth Amendment violation would be found 
where, although counsel “assist[s] the accused during trial, the likelihood 
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance 
 
47 Id. (citation omitted).   
48 Id. at 652. 
49 Id. at 666-67.  
50 Id. at 666.  
51 Id. at 662.  
52 Id. (emphasis added). 
53 Id. at 658.  
54 Id. at 659-60.  
55 Id. at 659.  
56 Id. at 659. As an example, the Court noted that where a defendant is “denied the right of 
effective cross-examination,” it “would be constitutional error of the first magnitude and no 
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 
318 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate.”57 Cronic therefore 
applies only “where a criminal defendant was actually or constructively 
denied counsel,” not where he solely alleges that his representation was 
inadequate.58 In other words, if any of the three circumstances outlined in 
Cronic were found to exist, a defendant’s conviction and sentence would not 
stand. 
Cronic’s exception to Strickland prejudice analysis, which requires a showing 
that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasona-
bleness” and that the error prejudiced the judgment,59 was expanded before 
the ink dried on the opinion. In Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court distin-
guished between cases like Cronic and those alleging “actual ineffectiveness,” 
explaining that “the defendant must prove both incompetence and preju-
dice” only where “the defendant alleges ‘actual’ ineffective assistance rather 
than the few contexts where ineffective assistance is ‘presumed,’ such as 
where counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting the 
accused during a critical stage.”60 After Morrison, it was clear that allegations 
of actual ineffective assistance were distinct from allegations under circum-
stances where prejudice would be presumed under Cronic. That is, Sixth 
Amendment claims under Cronic were no longer subject to the substantive 
review for prejudice mandated by Strickland.61  
A more recent case, Bell v. Cone, reaffirmed this distinction.62 There, the 
Court again considered allegations of “actual” ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In its opinion below, the Sixth Circuit conflated the Cronic and 
Strickland standards, performing the analysis required by the latter while 
using the reasoning and legal standard of the former.63 The Supreme Court 
 
57 Id. at 659-60 (identifying Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), as an example of this type 
of case).  
58 Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Being There: Constructive Denial of Counsel at a Competency Hearing 
as Structural Error Under the Sixth Amendment, 56 S.D. L. REV. 238, 241 (2011). 
59 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-92 (1984) (holding that “deficien-
cies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective 
assistance under the Constitution” but noting that prejudice may be presumed in certain contexts).  
60 477 U.S. 365, 381 & n.6 (1986) (emphasis added).  
61 See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88-89 (1988) (citing Cronic and explaining that it 
would be “inappropriate to apply . . . the prejudice requirement of Strickland” where new counsel 
was not appointed after initial counsel withdrew, leaving “petitioner completely without represen-
tation during the appellate court’s actual decisional process”).  
62 535 U.S. 685, 695-98 (2002) (discussing whether the principles of Cronic or Strickland 
should govern respondent’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
63 Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 979 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “Cone need not show actual 
prejudice” under Cronic, yet applying the Strickland analysis to conclude that his attorney’s failure 
to present mitigating evidence or make a final argument “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and prejudiced him”).  
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quoted Cronic’s three exceptional circumstances in which prejudice can be 
presumed64 and explained that all other deprivation claims would be 
analyzed under Strickland.65  
II. COMPETENCY HEARINGS AS A CRITICAL STAGE 
By this point, the reader should have a basic understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, as well as the development of the critical 
stage concept that mandates its application in certain contexts. However, 
the question remains: where do competency hearings fit within this 
framework? The answer is that competency hearings have never been 
declared “critical stages” by the Supreme Court, and therefore, whether the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee applies during this stage remains an open 
question. Nevertheless, competence has been addressed extensively by other 
areas of the law (and by circuit courts), and an understanding of these 
historical origins helps to inform the current discussion. 
Competence is a topic that “lie[s] at the intersection of psychiatry, con-
stitutional law, and criminal procedure.”66 From the common law67 to the 
Constitution,68 and through rules of criminal procedure69 to federal legisla-
tion,70 incompetent defendants have long been protected from the perils of 
facing trial. Perhaps the most important source of protection is the Consti-
tution itself. A defendant’s right to proffer a defense in his case is guaran-
teed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.71 The protections of 
 
64 Bell, 535 U.S. at 695-96. 
65 Id. at 696-98 (finding that counsel’s conduct did not fall within a Cronic exception and was 
“plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland’s 
performance and prejudice components”).  
66 Brett F. Kinney, Comment, An Incompetent Jurisprudence: The Burden of Proof in Competency 
Hearings, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 688 (2009). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., 
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION (2008) 
(exploring the intersection of law and mental health).  
67 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (explaining that common law 
principles provided the foundation for the prohibition on incompetent defendants facing trial in 
modern criminal procedure); Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899) (cataloging 
the prohibition’s history).  
68 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing due process rights). 
69 See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (explaining that the competency of a 
criminal defendant must be established before trial (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 
(1966))); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (“For our purposes, it suffices to note that 
the prohibition [against subjecting an incompetent person to trial] is fundamental to an adversary 
system of justice.”).  
70 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012) (establishing a system of competency hearings and civil 
confinement for defendants whose competency to stand trial is questioned).  
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
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the Due Process Clause, found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
have also been interpreted to prohibit incompetent defendants from standing 
trial.72  
Many trace these constitutional limits back to the traditional ban on trials 
in absentia, which prohibited trying an incompetent defendant who, 
although physically present in the court room, was not sufficiently mentally 
present to defend himself against the charges he faced.73 Although competency 
as a standard does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all definition, the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of competency has been consistent with these 
traditional roots. In Dusky v. United States, the Court articulated a concrete 
test for competence, agreeing with the Solicitor General’s suggestion that 
“the test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”74 If questions are raised regarding a defendant’s 
ability to satisfy this test, the trial court must hold a competency hearing.75 
Specifically, a defendant is subject to a competency hearing “where evidence 
from any source, including the trial judge’s own doubts about the defendant’s 
competence, raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s competency.”76 
A trial judge has the discretion to determine whether a bona fide doubt 
exists and is able to draw inferences from the defendant’s own conduct as 
 
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (finding the right to present a defense to 
be “a fundamental element of due process of law”).  
72 See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 434 n.6 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The 
right to be tried and convicted only if legally competent inheres in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and thus implicates constitutional principles in addition to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
requirements . . . .” (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 378)).  
73 See, e.g., Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. 
PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960) (“The competency rule did not evolve from philosophical notions of 
punishability, but rather has deep roots in the common law as a by-product of the ban against trials 
in absentia . . . .”); see also Kinney, supra note 66, at 689 (“The prohibition [on incompetent 
defendants standing trial] may have stemmed from the ban on trials in absentia.”). See generally 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (“[T]he defendant must be present at . . . every trial stage, including jury 
impanelment and the return of the verdict . . . .”).  
74 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012) (requiring a competency hearing if the court at any time has 
“reasonable cause” to believe that the defendant may be mentally incompetent).  
76 40 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 171 (1984); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (“Where the evi-
dence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own 
motion must impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing . . . .”); People v. Leiker, 450 N.E.2d 37, 
40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (citing Pate for the proposition that “[t]he failure to follow procedures 
adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried while incompetent violates the defendant’s 
due process rights”).  
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well as outside information.77 Importantly, if a defendant is found to be 
incompetent, he will not face charges until his competency is restored, if at 
all.78 Therefore, the outcome of a competency hearing is clearly of great 
consequence to a defendant’s fate. But the following question remains: is a 
defendant’s competency hearing a critical stage at which the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel attaches?  
The Supreme Court has yet to provide an answer to this question; 
“[h]owever, every federal court of appeals to take up the question has 
answered it affirmatively.”79 After all, “[t]he Supreme Court has defined 
critical stages as those proceedings between an individual and agents of the 
State . . . that amount to trial-like confrontations, at which counsel would 
help the accused in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his adversary, 
and hold significant consequences for the accused.”80 The trial-type 
proceedings and serious consequences characteristic of competency hearings 
leave little doubt that such hearings are covered by the critical stage doc-
trine. Therefore, as with any other “critical stage,” the Sixth Amendment 
right to the assistance of counsel attaches at a competency hearing. Howev-
er, although the right to counsel is not absolute, and defendants are normally 
free to decline such assistance,81 competency hearings are different. There, 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee becomes a mandate. 
 
77 See, e.g., Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a criminal 
defendant failed to establish a bona fide doubt as to his competency even though he was conspicu-
ously asleep during approximately seventy percent of his murder trial); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 
940, 948 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not holding 
a competency hearing where “there was scant evidence before the trial court that [defendant] had a 
history of irrational behavior”), overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp. 1535, 1548 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (holding that defendant’s 
trial conduct “was not so unusual . . . that it should have raised a bona fide doubt on the part of the 
trial court that would have required it to conduct a Pate hearing”). 
78 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)-(e) (2012) (providing for a system of evaluation, 
treatment, and discharge of mentally incompetent defendants).  
79 Parsons, supra note 58, at 242 & n.31 (citing Raymond v. Weber, 552 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 
215 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554, 1556 (4th Cir. 1992); Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 
1986)); see also United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Parsons’s article and 
explicitly joining the other circuits in finding a competency hearing to be a critical stage).  
80 Parsons, supra note 58, at 241 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
81 See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 (2004) (“A person accused of crime, however, may 
choose to forgo representation . . . . [T]he Constitution ‘does not force a lawyer upon a defend-
ant.’” (citation omitted)); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) (“The language and spirit 
of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel . . . shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not 
an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself 
personally.”). 
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Before permitting a defendant to waive his right to counsel, a court must 
ensure that the accused is “knowingly and intelligently [choosing to] forgo 
those relinquished benefits.”82 A defendant’s waiver must, in general, be 
“knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”83 In addition to this requirement, the 
trial court must find that the defendant “actually does understand the 
significance and consequences of a particular decision” and that his waiver is 
“uncoerced.”84 But the circumstances that lead a trial court to question a 
defendant’s competence—and thus to hold a competency hearing—directly 
undermine his ability to validly waive his right to counsel. Unlike other 
“critical stages” in a criminal proceeding, a competency hearing is meant to 
examine the defendant’s mental state and establish (or find lacking) the very 
abilities necessary for him to enter a valid waiver. Only if a defendant “has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” can 
he decide to waive his right to counsel.85 As a result, unless a defendant’s 
competence is confirmed at a hearing, he cannot be said to “knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently” consent to waiver. The mirror version of that 
statement is easier to understand: how can a defendant, found by a court to 
be incompetent, also be permitted to represent himself in that same court?86 
He cannot.  
 
82 Karl Evan Strauss, Between the Defendant’s Scylla and Charybdis: Brooks v. McCaughtry and 
the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right to Self-Representation, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 245 (2005) 
(quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
83 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 36 (2006); see Kenneth S. Sogabe, Note, Exer-
cising the Right to Self-Representation in United States v. Farhad: Issues in Waiving a Criminal 
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 136 & n.52 
(2000) (citing Faretta for the “right to waive” counsel and the “right to self-representation”); see 
also David C. Donehue, Note, Peters v. Gunn: Should the Illiterate Defendant Have a Right to Self-
Representation?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) (citing Faretta for the proposition that before a 
defendant can waive his right to counsel, the record must establish that “he knows what he is 
doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
84 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-
78 (2008) (permitting separate standards for competency to stand trial and competency to proceed 
pro se); see also Alan R. Felthous, The Right to Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive 
Counsel and Conduct One’s Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 105, 108-09 (1994) (citing Godinez and distinguishing competency generally 
from the competency necessary to enter a guilty plea or waive the right to counsel).  
85 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
86 See United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t [is] contradictory to 
conclude that a defendant whose competency is reasonably in question could nevertheless 
knowingly and intelligently waive her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Such a defendant may 
not proceed pro se until the question of her competency to stand trial has been resolved.”); see also 
United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Logically, the trial court cannot 
simultaneously question a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial and at one and the same 
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Recognizing this internal inconsistency, every circuit to consider the 
issue has held that a competency hearing is a critical stage at which the 
defendant must be represented by counsel.87 At any point in the trial, even 
if the defendant previously proceeded pro se, “[w]hen a defendant’s mental 
ability to waive the right to counsel and exercise the right of self-
representation has been brought into reasonable question, the trial court 
must therefore hold a competency hearing to determine the proper 
course.”88 In such a case, the “defendant may not proceed pro se until the 
question of her competency to stand trial has been resolved.”89 But the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee is not satisfied simply by the physical presence 
of a lawyer at a defendant’s competency hearing.90 As Ronald Parsons 
explains in his article on constructive denial of counsel, “courts have recog-
nized in such circumstances that a lawyer simply ‘being there’ is not 
enough.”91 Regardless of whether a physically present lawyer fails to provide 
the requisite degree of representation, or whether a defendant is simply not 
represented during his competency hearing, recognizing that a deprivation 
has occurred does not end the court’s analysis. A remedy must follow.  
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY  
FOR A COMPETENCY STAGE DEPRIVATION 
As we have seen, circuit courts uniformly apply the Cronic standard—not 
the Strickland prejudice standard—when analyzing allegations of competency 
stage deprivations. This uniformity, however, does not extend to the courts’ 
choices of an appropriate remedy.92 This Part examines the circuit split over 
 
time be convinced that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel.”). 
87 See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he Consti-
tution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to 
stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are 
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”).  
88 Parsons, supra note 58, at 239.  
89 Id. at 242.  
90 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (explaining that counsel’s total failure 
“to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” would be “a denial of Sixth 
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable”); Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978) (explaining that being physically present is not enough 
when an attorney is representing multiple defendants with conflicting interests). 
91 Parsons, supra note 58, at 239.  
92 Compare United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2010) (remanding for 
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the district court can make a retrospective competency 
determination), and United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the presence of counsel would have altered the result of 
the competency hearing), with United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
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the proper remedy for competency stage deprivations. Using two courts of 
appeals decisions as examples, I explain the two distinct remedies courts 
choose. While this Comment ultimately advocates for the use of one over 
the other, an understanding of both remedies and their justifications is 
critical in order to make a meaningful distinction between them.  
A. The United States v. Klat Approach: Evidentiary Hearings 
United States v. Klat93 came to the D.C. Circuit with a rich factual history. 
In 1996, the defendant, Susan Viola Klat, was indicted on two counts of 
threatening to assault Chief Justice Rehnquist and William Suter, the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 115 and 1114.94 Her 
threatening voice messages, letters, and statements about both men were 
intended as retaliation for their performance in their official capacities.95  
Klat repeatedly asserted her desire to represent herself at trial. Her 
request was eventually granted when appointed counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw, partly as a response to Klat filing a separate civil suit against 
him.96 During a district court hearing, however, the judge found Klat’s 
behavior sufficiently “bizarre” to provide the “reasonable cause” necessary to 
evaluate her competence under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b).97 Despite granting 
appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, the district court failed to appoint 
new counsel.98 At the formal competency hearing, Klat was found compe-
tent and able to continue representing herself at trial.99 During this same 
hearing, she agreed to have standby counsel appointed for the remainder of 
the proceeding.100  
At trial, Klat delivered an opening statement and cross-examined two 
witnesses before refusing to continue pro se because she felt “too emotion-
al.”101 Thereafter, standby counsel represented her during the remainder of 
the trial and sentencing.102 The jury found Klat guilty on both counts, and 
 
that the proper remedy for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel at a competency hearing is 
an automatic reversal), and Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).  
93 156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
94 Id. at 1260-61.  
95 Id. at 1260.  
96 Id. at 1261.  
97 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 1262. 
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
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she was subsequently sentenced to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment, to 
run concurrently, for each count.103  
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, Klat alleged that the district court erred 
by “allowing her to appear pro se at a hearing to determine her competency 
to stand trial.”104 The D.C. Circuit explained that Klat, like every criminal 
defendant, had the “right to counsel at every critical stage of [her] criminal 
prosecution.”105 Relying on precedent,106 the court stated that a competency 
hearing constitutes a critical stage at which the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attaches.107 But competency hearings were different. Although Klat 
was permitted to waive her right to counsel during other “critical stages,” 
the court reasoned that “where a defendant’s competence to stand trial is 
reasonably in question, a court may not allow that defendant to waive her 
right to counsel and proceed pro se until the issue of competency has been 
resolved.”108 Because competence is a prerequisite to waiving counsel, the 
court found it is “contradictory to conclude that a defendant whose compe-
tency is reasonably in question could nevertheless knowingly and intelli-
gently waive her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”109 Rejecting the 
remainder of Klat’s claims, the D.C. Circuit found that the district court 
erred when it allowed her to proceed pro se during her competency hearing.110  
The panel next acknowledged that remedies were an unsettled issue.111 
While “some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error,”112 the court explained, not 
“all non-trial denials of counsel require automatic reversal of a defendant’s 
conviction.”113 Instead, the court stated that under certain conditions, the 
proper remedy is to remand for an evidentiary hearing under the Chapman 
standard.114 The court explained that an automatic reversal was only appro-
priate where “the deprivation of the right to counsel affected—and 
 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 1260.  
105 Id. at 1262.  
106 See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).  
107 Klat, 156 F.3d at 1262.  
108 Id. at 1262-63 (footnote omitted).  
109 Id. at 1263.  
110 Id. at 1260, 1263.  
111 Id. at 1263-64.  
112 Id. at 1263 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
113 Id. (referencing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970), where the Supreme Court 
“remanded the case to the state court to determine whether the denial of counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing was harmless error under Chapman v. California” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
114 Id. at 1263-64.  
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contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding.”115 In order to determine 
whether Klat’s case met that condition, the court remanded “for an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether the competency hearing could have 
come out differently if appellant had been represented by counsel.”116 
Explaining that the purpose of the retrospective hearing was only to 
determine whether a lawyer could have changed the outcome of the compe-
tency hearing—not to determine if Klat was in fact competent—the court 
reasoned that the effects of the deprivation of counsel could potentially be 
limited to that stage of the proceeding.117 This approach will hereinafter be 
identified as the “Klat approach,” referring to the use of evidentiary hearings 
to determine prejudice. Not all circuits are willing to endorse its use. 
B. The United States v. Ross Approach: Automatic Reversals 
A sophisticated securities conspiracy gave rise to United States v. Ross.118 
The five defendants in the case concocted a scheme to buy motor vehicles 
from private sellers in exchange for counterfeit “official checks” and then 
resell those vehicles before the sellers realized that the checks were worthless.119 
The prosecution described Bryan Ross as the defendant who “conceived the 
scheme” and was “primarily responsible for orchestrating” it.120  
Prior to the start of trial, three court-appointed attorneys withdrew 
because of Ross’s “bizarre and paranoid behavior.”121 After several demands, 
Ross’s request to proceed pro se was granted.122 Standby counsel was also 
appointed.123 The Government promptly filed—and the court granted—a 
motion for a competency examination and hearing.124 At the competency 
hearing, the court found Ross to be competent based on its own observa-
tions and a clinical report prepared by a court-appointed psychologist.125 
However, Ross was not provided with full-time counsel during the compe-
tency hearing.126 In fact, standby counsel withdrew, and the court appointed 
 
115 Id. at 1264 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
118 703 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 2012).  
119 Id.  
120 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 865-66.  
123 Id. at 866.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
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yet another attorney to serve as standby counsel.127 Ross continued to 
represent himself for the remainder of the proceedings, including trial.128 
When the jury returned its verdict, Ross was sentenced to imprisonment on 
various counts.129 He received one sixty month sentence for the conspiracy 
conviction and five seventy-eight month sentences for each substantive 
count, all to be served concurrently.130 Ross appealed both his conviction 
and sentence to the Sixth Circuit.131 
The Sixth Circuit found that the district court erred when it did not 
reappoint counsel to represent Ross while his competency was in dispute.132 
Following other circuits, the court held that a competency hearing was a 
critical stage.133 Indeed, “a psychological impairment would go to the 
question of whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.”134 
Therefore, the district court’s failure to appoint full-time counsel to repre-
sent Ross at the hearing and inform him of his rights to testify, present 
evidence, subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine witnesses 
“den[ied] the court the ability to ensure Ross knowingly waived those 
rights.”135 Without a knowing or voluntary waiver, the district court erred 
when it did not reappoint full-time counsel at Ross’s competency hearing.136 
The remedy discussion was complicated, however, by the possibility that 
Ross’s standby representation was satisfactory under the circumstances 
articulated in Cronic. As the court explained, “[a]lthough Ross’s standby 
counsel did not present argument during the competency hearing, it is 
conceivable that he did satisfy the minimum standard by adequately investi-
gating, undertaking appropriate preparation for the hearing and then 
making an independent, strategic decision not to contest competency.”137 
Putting this issue aside, the Ross court’s decision on the appropriate remedy 
differed dramatically from the decision in Klat.  
 
127 Id.  
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 873-74.  
134 Id. at 867 (quoting United States v. Kidwell, 217 F. App’x 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2007)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  
135 Id. at 869.  
136 Id. (“[A] defendant cannot represent himself at his own competency hearing, the purpose 
of which is to determine whether a defendant understands and can participate in the proceedings 
in the first place.”).  
137 Id. at 873. 
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First, the panel reiterated that “a complete absence of counsel at a criti-
cal stage of a criminal proceeding is a per se Sixth Amendment violation 
warranting reversal of a conviction, a sentence, or both, as applicable, 
without analysis for prejudice or harmless error.”138 Second, the court saw 
“no reason to create an exception to our established rule that complete 
deprivation of counsel during a critical stage warrants automatic reversal 
without consideration of prejudice.”139 Stopping far short of requiring a 
separate hearing to determine whether the absence of full-time counsel 
actually resulted in prejudice, the court mandated automatic reversal if the 
Cronic standard was not satisfied.140 If on remand the district court found 
that Ross had been deprived of counsel under Cronic, “the conviction and 
sentence [would be] vacated.”141 Analysis for prejudice was inappropriate.  
The Ross court’s decision to order an automatic reversal when a criminal 
defendant is deprived of counsel at his competency hearing was grounded in 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. Indeed, reliance on such 
authorities is expected in a federal court of appeals. When federal courts 
settle on the proper remedy in these cases, however, alternative reasoning 
may also be at play. Through contractual, practical, and behavioral analysis, 
the Ross automatic reversal approach appears to be superior to the Klat 
evidentiary hearings approach. The next Part examines the remedy question 
through these alternative lenses, explaining the benefits and limitations of 
each.  
IV. THREE ARGUMENTS FOR CHOOSING AUTOMATIC REVERSALS 
A. The Bargaining Theory and Its Pro Se Contract 
When a criminal defendant is deprived of counsel at his competency 
hearing, the remedy should be an automatic reversal. The civil treatment of 
incompetence under contract law provides a useful lens through which one 
may arrive at this conclusion. The majority contract rule of incompetence is 
that “an incompetent person’s transactions are voidable.”142 The rule is 
 
138 Id. at 873-74 (quoting Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  
139 Id. at 874.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 10:3 (4th ed. 2009); see also Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd. of N.Y., 250 N.E.2d 460, 
464 (N.Y. 1969) (“The well-established rule is that contracts of a mentally incompetent per-
son . . . are voidable. Even where the contract has been partly or fully performed it will still be 
avoided upon restoration of the status quo.”). 
  
2014] Pro Se Paternalism 303 
 
rooted in the requirement that for contracts to be bargained-for, “parties to 
them [must] have the psychological and intellectual capacity to understand 
and evaluate the consequences of their agreements.”143 As Professor 
Eisenberg explains,  
[a] party (the “promisee”) who induces another (the “promisor”) to make a 
bargain on unfair terms by exploiting the latter’s incapacity has acted in a 
manner that violates conventional moral standards. . . . Efficiency con-
siderations also fail to support application of the bargain principle in such 
cases. The maxim that a promisor is the best judge of his own utility can 
have little application: by hypothesis, the promisor is not able to make a 
well-informed judgment concerning the transaction.144  
Importantly, a contracting party’s capacity at the time of the execution of 
the contract determines his ability or inability to make the agreement.145 
The majority rule recognizes that contracting with an incompetent party is 
neither fair nor efficient and shifts the costs of noncompliance to the 
definitively competent party.  
Proceeding pro se should be viewed as a continuing contractual 
relationship between the defendant and the court. Just like a traditional 
contract for goods or services, a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel 
must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”146 Indeed, similar to the 
requirements for contractual capacity, a trial court must find that a pro se 
defendant “actually does understand the significance and consequences of a 
particular decision.”147 Therefore, where a defendant is the subject of a 
competency hearing and the trial court errs by allowing him to proceed 
 
143 Michael Wayne Brooks, Case Note, Kids Waiving Goodbye to Their Rights: An Argument 
Against Juveniles’ Ability to Waive Their Right to Remain Silent During Police Interrogations, 13 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 219, 229 (2004) (quoting ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT 
LAW AND THEORY 481 (3d ed. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
144 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 765-
66 (1982). 
145 See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 141 (1999) (“The mental incapacity, or unsoundness of mind, 
that affects the validity of a contract must be of the time at which the transaction occurs, 
regardless of previous or subsequent insanity.” (footnotes omitted)).  
146 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 36 (2006); see also Donehue, supra note 83, at 
214 (explaining that before a defendant can waive his right to counsel, the court must establish that 
“he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quoting Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sogabe, supra note 83, at 139-40 
(noting that Supreme Court precedent requires any waiver of counsel be made knowingly and 
intelligently).  
147 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993); see also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 
164, 177-78 (2008) (permitting separate standards for competency to stand trial and competency to 
proceed pro se); Felthous, supra note 84, at 108 (distinguishing competency generally from the 
competency necessary to enter a guilty plea or waive the right to counsel).  
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unrepresented, the issue of his competence has not been properly resolved. 
Any agreement flowing from this failure to adjudicate competence should 
be evaluated in the same way as it would be under the contractual frame-
work. This would mean that a defendant’s continuing waiver of counsel 
would have to satisfy the elements of a valid contract for the pro se contract 
to be enforceable. But a pro se contract cannot be valid if, at any time 
during the criminal proceeding, the defendant’s competence is called into 
question. If a criminal defendant is deprived of counsel at this “critical 
stage,” the “pro se contract” should be voidable at the discretion of the 
defendant. But why void the trial? 
Professor Eisenberg’s reasoning, explaining why contracts with incompe-
tent parties are inappropriate, applies with even more force to the pro se 
contract. First, a court allowing a defendant whose competence is in doubt 
to waive counsel “violates conventional moral standards” deeply rooted in 
our society.148 Unlike a contract without mutual assent, a defendant’s 
competency stage deprivation runs afoul of the Constitution.149 Second, 
allowing a determination of one’s competence to be made without counsel is 
inefficient. Like voidable contracts, “[t]he maxim that a promisor is the best 
judge of his own utility can have little application.”150 Indeed, the purpose 
of the competency hearing itself is to determine whether that maxim 
applies. Recognizing a waiver before the requisite competence is estab-
lished, therefore, puts the cart before the horse.  
The inefficiency flowing from defendants proceeding unrepresented at 
competency hearings comes in several forms. One form is theoretical: 
illegitimate waivers remove defense counsel from trials where they rightfully 
belong. The Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel was established to minimize 
the imbalance of power between the accused and the government within our 
adversarial system.151 The right recognizes that the American criminal 
justice system is complex and is meant to protect the layman who may be 
unable to effectively navigate his defense alone.152 Therefore, each time a 
 
148 Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 765.  
149 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
150 Eisenberg, supra note 144, at 765.  
151 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (“The presence of coun-
sel . . . operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our 
adversary theory of criminal prosecution.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The 
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel.”). 
152 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (“Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.” (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69)); 
see also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (“[A layman] often depends upon legal advice 
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defendant is unrepresented during his competency hearing, the trial that 
follows is theoretically less efficient.  
A second form of inefficiency is any post-trial appeals that flow from 
violations of the pro se contract. The very subject of this Comment—the 
proper remedy after a competency stage deprivation—is relevant only when 
a post-trial appeal is being decided. Regardless of the remedy that a court 
ultimately chooses, the draining of judicial resources and credibility is a 
necessary consequence of this trial-level error. Instead of the theoretical, 
market-based inefficiency of voidable contracts, however, the violation of 
the pro se contract introduces immediate and tangible inefficiency into the 
federal system. Therefore, a trial judge’s violation of the pro se contract 
taints the agreement at least as much as—and arguably even more than—the 
making of a contract for goods or services with an incompetent party. 
Because the two violations mirror each other in important ways, the estab-
lished remedy for contractual incapacity should inform the analysis of 
competency stage deprivations.  
The majority contract rule is that “an incompetent person’s transactions 
are voidable.”153 If one accepts the analogy between traditional contracts and 
the pro se contract, the next question is: how does this rule translate into an 
appellate remedy following a deprivation of counsel? This question helps 
clarify the distinctions between automatic reversals (Ross) and evidentiary 
hearings (Klat), and it leads to the conclusion that the former is the more 
appropriate remedy for pro se contract violations.  
Automatic reversal closely resembles the voiding of a traditional 
contract. If a contract with an incompetent party is voidable at the incom-
petent party’s discretion, automatic reversals would provide aggrieved 
defendants with a functionally equivalent remedy. A judicial error that does 
not negatively affect the trial (in the defendant’s view),154 like a mutually 
beneficial contract, could stand. If the defendant was not satisfied with the 
outcome of his trial, however, an appeal would function as a request to void 
the result. An appellate court would simply evaluate whether any required 
element of a valid waiver, like a required element of an enforceable contract, 
was absent during trial. If the reviewing court finds a missing element, then 
the waiver and conviction would not stand.  
 
from someone who is trained and skilled in the subject matter . . . .”); Howe, supra note 10, at 134 
(“The primary purpose of th[e] guarantee [of counsel] is to help the layman when confronted with 
the inherent complexity of the American system of criminal law.”).  
153 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 142, § 10:3.  
154 The judicial error in this case would be allowing a defendant to proceed unrepresented at 
his competency hearing.  
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Automatic reversals are also consistent with the contract incapacity timing 
rule, which states that a contracting party’s capacity at the time of the 
execution of the contract determines his ability to make the agreement in 
question.155 Therefore, where a trial court determines a defendant’s compe-
tence to proceed pro se during a hearing where the defendant is unrepre-
sented, the window of time during which competence must be confirmed is 
irretrievably lost. Automatic reversals recognize the importance of this lost 
opportunity. Instead of attempting to recreate that moment in time, the 
automatic-reversal remedy acknowledges the “fluid state of mental illness”156 
and the “inherent unreliability and inadequacy of all retrospective hearings.”157 
This recognition would lead a court following the Ross approach to ask the 
right question: was there a valid agreement to proceed pro se or was a 
required element of the agreement absent? Without a constitutionally-valid 
waiver, a defendant would not be able to represent himself under this 
approach.  
 By contrast, an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not a 
competency stage deprivation was harmless has a completely different 
focus—one that is arguably misguided. Evidentiary hearings do not ask 
whether a waiver of counsel was valid. Instead, they ask whether any 
potential invalidity in the waiver procedure made a difference at trial. This 
question essentially works like a contract rule stating that a contract with an 
incompetent party is voidable by that party only if (1) the court finds that 
the contract was a bad deal, and (2) absent the party’s incompetence, the 
result of the deal would be different. Put another way, finding that a compe-
tency stage deprivation of counsel was “harmless error” after an evidentiary 
hearing shows that the court nonetheless substantially performed its 
constitutional duties. 
However, it makes little sense to speak in terms of “substantial perfor-
mance” of Sixth Amendment protections. Unlike a construction contract 
 
155 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 141 (1999) (“The mental incapacity, or unsoundness of mind, that 
affects the validity of a contract must be of the time at which the transaction occurs, regardless of 
previous or subsequent insanity.”). 
156 Hannah Robertson Miller, Note, “A Meaningless Ritual”: How the Lack of a Postconviction 
Competency Standard Deprives the Mentally Ill of Effective Habeas Review in Texas, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
267, 296 (2008); see also Michael L. Radelet & Kent S. Miller, The Aftermath of Ford v. Wain-
wright, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 339, 349-50 (1992) (describing the issues that surround cases in 
which death row inmates vacillate between competency and incompetency). 
157 David W. Beaudreau, Comment, Due Process or “Some Process”? Restoring Pate v. Robinson’s 
Guarantee of Adequate Competency Procedures, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 369, 404 (2011); see also United 
States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 982 n.9 (8th Cir. 1991) (“To require a sentencing court to decide 
whether a defendant was competent during proceedings that took place years earlier would be an 
exercise in futility.”). 
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that may be “substantially performed” despite a less-than-perfect execu-
tion,158 a criminal trial where a defendant invalidly proceeds pro se cannot 
produce a “nearly constitutional” trial. A “nearly constitutional” trial is 
unconstitutional, and a competency stage deprivation poisons the entirety 
of the proceedings.159 Yet, the focus of evidentiary hearings in this context, 
however improper, is to differentiate between levels of unconstitutionality.  
Attempting to retrospectively assess a defendant’s competence is also 
inconsistent with the contract incapacity timing rule for a more practical 
reason. Because a defendant’s competence at “the time of the execution”160 
of the pro se contract is never validly determined in these circumstances, 
retrospective hearings attempt to recreate “the defendant’s condition at the 
time of the original state proceedings.”161 However, when a defendant “is 
denied his statutory right to counsel during a hearing, it is nearly impossible 
for an appellate court to determine whether this error was harmless.”162 
Competency stage deprivations are especially difficult to analyze. Harm-
lessness must be decided “on the basis of a record developed at an eviden-
tiary hearing conducted in the absence of that counsel,” while “only 
speculat[ion] on what the record might have been had counsel been provided” 
is possible.163 The continued use of evidentiary hearings instead of automat-
ic reversals, therefore, puts Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on an unstable 
foundation. The right to counsel cannot be partially performed, and every 
evidentiary hearing that finds “harmless error” undermines the credibility 
of the judiciary.  
 
158 See 15 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 142, § 44:52 (4th ed. 2000) (“Pursuant to the 
doctrine of ‘substantial performance,’ a technical breach of the terms of a contract is ex-
cused . . . because actual performance is so similar to the required performance that any breach 
that may have been committed is immaterial.”).  
159 As the Supreme Court explained in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991), 
automatic reversal is appropriate where the court makes a structural error. Structural errors “defy 
analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards . . . [because they affect] the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. The Court already 
recognizes that a complete denial of counsel during a criminal trial is structural error. See United 
States v. Lewis, 21 F. App’x 843, 846 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Among the rights deemed ‘structural’ by the 
Supreme Court is the complete denial of counsel during a criminal trial.” (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))). 
160 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 141 (1999).  
161 See Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996). 
162 Lewis, 21 F. App’x at 846.  
163 United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Green v. United States, 262 
F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the government cannot retrospectively demonstrate 
harmless error “by relying upon testimony from the very hearing at which [a defendant] was 
unrepresented”). 
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B. Pragmatism: The Practical Futility of Evidentiary Hearings 
The second reason to automatically reverse after a competency stage 
deprivation is simple—it will work well in practice. A theory’s value is often 
a function of its ease of application. A rule or standard that judges fail to 
correctly understand or interpret provides little utility. As Girvan and 
Deason explain,  
[t]he ability to operationalize the social theory embodied in the law is highly 
relevant to the development of sound, predictable, and reliable legal stand-
ards. . . . To the extent that [a] hypothesis is poorly operationalized 
such that it is not easily or obviously testable against the sort of evidence 
that is likely to be available . . . [case] outcomes . . . will be unneces-
sarily error prone at best and unpredictably random at worst.164 
The Ross automatic-reversal rule is more practical than the Klat evidentiary 
hearing standard. This conclusion is based primarily on an application of 
the well-known rules versus standards debate to the specific contours of 
competency stage deprivations.165  
Rules and standards are two “different forms that a directive can take.”166 
For example, a rule might state that “no driver shall travel above sixty-five 
miles-per-hour in a vehicle” or, more relevant here, “a defendant deprived 
of counsel during a hearing to determine his competence shall have his 
conviction and sentence reversed.” These directives, instead framed as 
standards, might state that “any driver traveling at an excessive speed will be 
subject to an appropriate fine” or “a defendant who is deprived of counsel 
during a hearing to determine his competence may have his conviction 
reversed only if the absence of counsel affected the result.” Of course, rules 
and standards each have benefits and limitations. In his pioneering work on 
the rules versus standards debate, Duncan Kennedy attempted to catalog 
these considerations by creating the following table: 
 
164 Erik J. Girvan & Grace Deason, Social Science in Law: A Psychological Case for Abandoning 
the “Discriminatory Motive” Under Title VII, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1066-67 (2013).  
165 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992) (applying economic analysis to compare rulemaking versus standard setting at the agency 
and individual levels); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (examining the rules versus standards debate within the context of 
altruism versus individual-focused selfishness models); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis 
and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (viewing the rules versus 
standards debate through a behavioral science lens); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995) (comparing an approach to legal judgment based on abstract principles 
to one based on case-by-case decisionmaking). 
166 Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 195, 225 (2009). 
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Table 1: Rules vs. Standards167 
 
Benefits of 





Provide for easy 
application 
Provide only a 
crude application 










Can be applied 
to new 
developments 





Box judges in Vest trust in 
judges 








Hard to operationalize 
 
Admittedly, a cursory examination of the above table can make the topic 
of this Comment seem like an exercise in futility. If both the rule-based, 
automatic reversal approach and the standard-based, evidentiary hearing 
approach have competing benefits and limitations, the choice of one over 
the other might seem like a matter of preference. Application of these two 
approaches within the context of competency stage deprivations, however, 
reveals that they do not capture the benefits of their competing forms 
equally. Ross’s automatic reversal approach is able to capitalize on the 
advantages of rules while minimizing the impact of many of their inherent 
limitations. By contrast, the ability of Klat evidentiary hearings to produce 
the general benefits of standards is doubtful, and the limitations of the form 
are quite concerning within this context.  
A competency stage deprivation of counsel prevents a proper, ex ante 
determination of a defendant’s competence. Ross automatic reversals do not 
try to make such a determination ex post, opting instead to provide a 
bright-line rule once a competency stage deprivation is found. This remedy 
captures some of the most important benefits of rules: reversals are easy to 
 
167 This table builds on and slightly modifies the original version provided in Kennedy, supra 
note 165, at 1710, which was cited and slightly modified in Schlag, supra note 166, at 226.  
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apply, provide uniform and predictable results, and rein in the power of the 
judge whose error prompted appellate review in the first instance. With 
regard to the potential disadvantages of rules, Ross automatic reversals 
cannot be said to be authoritarian or draconian. The remedy instead 
provides defendants relief from the coercive power of the State in cases 
where their constitutional rights were violated. Automatic reversal in the 
competency context is also unambiguous. Unlike the earlier example rule 
stating that “no driver shall travel more than 65 miles-per-hour in a vehicle,” 
which leaves a court to decide whether motorcycles or skateboards qualify as 
vehicles,168 competency stage deprivations are much clearer. Cronic and its 
progeny169 established the boundaries and continue to provide useful 
guideposts for courts to use in assessing constructive denial of counsel 
claims. Unlike the hypothetical speed-limit rule above, a rule focused on 
competency stage deprivations does not suffer from threshold definitional 
issues like the meaning of “vehicle.” This is not to say that none of the 
limitations of rules apply to post-deprivation automatic reversals, but those 
limitations that do apply are outweighed by competing benefits.  
By contrast, the circumstances giving rise to a competency stage depri-
vation make Klat’s standards-based approach less attractive when applied. 
Two of the most important benefits of standards are: (1) their empowerment 
of judges to make individualized decisions; and (2) their ability to arrive at 
(or at least attempt to arrive at) an objectively correct answer in every case. 
However, the flexibility which is usually a significant advantage of a stand-
ards-based approach seems problematic within the context of retrospective 
competency hearings. First, the same judge who erred by permitting the 
defendant to represent himself at his original competency hearing would 
likely preside over the retrospective hearing. If the same judge is tasked 
again with making a determination of a defendant’s rights, there is little 
justification for granting the judge broad discretion the second time around. 
Next, as discussed within the context of the “pro se contract,” coming to an 
objectively correct answer, even after a retrospective hearing, may be 
“nearly impossible.”170 This is because the harmlessness of a prior depriva-
tion of counsel must be decided on the “basis of a record developed . . . in 
 
168 See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607 (1958) (noting the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of words such as “vehicle” at the 
margins).  
169 See supra Section I.B.  
170 See United States v. Lewis, 21 F. App’x 843, 846 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing the difficul-
ties of retrospective hearings); see also supra Section IV.A. 
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the absence of that counsel.”171 At a minimum, any retrospective hearing 
would suffer from “the inherent unreliability and inadequacy of all retro-
spective hearings.”172 At worst, arriving at the “correct” result through 
holding a retrospective hearing may be “impossible.”173  
Additionally, the deficiencies of Klat retrospective hearings magnify the 
limitations characteristic of all standards-based approaches. Examining 
individual competency stage deprivations according to a vague standard 
yields results that are unpredictable, variable, and influenced by outside 
factors. Most importantly, however, remedying a Sixth Amendment 
violation with a procedurally inadequate retrospective hearing “completely 
vitiates the rights guaranteed . . . because such a remedy affirms the convic-
tion without ever holding a procedurally adequate competency hearing.”174 
By its very text, the Sixth Amendment applies to “all criminal prosecu-
tions.”175 But when courts make procedural exceptions to uphold the results 
of certain trials which did not meet the requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment, they lower the nation’s collective standards of justice. To avoid 
the further development of this incompetent jurisprudence, competency 
stage deprivations should be remedied through an automatic reversal rule.  
C. Deterring Volitional Behavior: Maximizing Compliance 
Through Prospect Theory 
A final justification for automatically reversing after a competency stage 
deprivation is based on deterrence. Automatic reversals have the potential 
to deter judicial malfeasance and misfeasance more effectively than eviden-
tiary hearings.176 That is, a future defendant’s constitutional right to counsel 
is less likely to be violated if automatic reversal is the remedy available for 
violations. Behavioral psychology, rooted in the insights of prospect theory,177 
explains why this is the case. Depriving a defendant of counsel at his 
competency hearing is constitutional error in every circuit that has decided 
 
171 See United States v. Vasquez, 7 F.3d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Green v. United States, 
262 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the government cannot retrospectively 
demonstrate harmless error “by relying upon testimony from the very hearing at which [a 
defendant] was unrepresented”). 
172 Beaudreau, supra note 157, at 404.  
173 See Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1986) (“When the state court fails [to 
hold a required competency hearing], it often may be impossible to repair the damage retrospec-
tively.”).  
174 Beaudreau, supra note 157, at 406.  
175 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
176 See infra subsection IV.C.1.  
177 See infra notes 187-96.  
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the issue.178 While the circuits are split over whether a Klat evidentiary 
hearing or a Ross automatic reversal is proper, a competency stage depriva-
tion is error under either approach. Appellate courts reviewing a case in 
which a defendant waived counsel before his competency hearing, therefore, 
all levy a punishment of sorts against trial courts—and trial court judges—
in the form of a remand. This punishment is the focus of deterrence theory.  
The purpose of punishment, generally, is to “announc[e] certain stand-
ards of behavior and attach[] penalties for deviation.”179 Just as lawmakers 
try to design criminal punishment systems that will deter undesirable 
behavior, appellate courts seek to optimize their control over district court 
abuses by “devising a penalty-setting system that assigns . . . punishments 
of a magnitude sufficient to deter a thinking [court] from committing” the 
same error.180 Put in economic terms, an appellate court shapes remedies so 
that the expected utility of future compliance for district court judges 
exceeds the expected benefits of noncompliance.181 With these incentives in 
mind, appellate courts can shape remedies to influence district court 
analyses and promote more accurate judicial decisionmaking.  
At its most basic level, a rational actor–deterrence model recognizes that 
individuals “respond to the incentives that they face, particularly the 
penalties which are imposed by the legal system.”182 Forced to preside over 
the “minefield”183 that pro se litigation creates, a trial court judge is incen-
tivized to avoid a penalty in the form of a remand of his judgment or 
sentencing decision. The full set of considerations faced by judges can be 
quantified by multiplying the likelihood of remand by the severity of the 
 
178 See supra Part II.  
179 Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 
949, 982 (1966) (quoting H. L. A. HART, PROLEGOMENON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PUNISHMENT 21-22 (1960)).  
180 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal 
Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2003).  
181 See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prose-
cutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 55 (2005) 
(providing a “law and economics” analysis in the context of deterrence of prosecutorial miscon-
duct).  
182 Id.  
183 See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using 
Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. ON 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 211 (2012) (arguing the rules imposed in court 
proceedings are a “minefield” for the pro se litigant); see also Drew A. Swank, Note, The Pro Se 
Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384 (2005) (claiming that pro se litigation results in 
inefficiency). 
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specific remedy mandated by the appellate court.184 More precisely, the 
simplified judicial incentive formula can be written as: LR x SP = EP, where 
LR is the likelihood of remand, SP is the severity of penalty, and EP is the 
total expected punishment.185 Assigning numeric values to the Ross and Klat 
remedies helps to demonstrate this point more concretely and illustrate 
their different deterrent potentials.  
First, for both approaches, the likelihood of remand remains constant. 
This is because appellate decisions to remand are not a function of the 
specific remedy attached. LR = 1 in both equations, therefore, because the 
remedy comes after an initial decision to remand. Second, automatic 
reversal is a more severe penalty than an evidentiary hearing carrying only 
the possibility of reversal. This difference is reflected in the equation by 
making SP = (-10) for automatic reversal, while SP = (-10) (0.5) + (0)(0.5) = 
(-5) for an evidentiary hearing with possible reversal. For purposes of 
simplicity, the chances of reversal after the model evidentiary hearing are 
set at 50 percent.186 Plugging both remedies into the formula yields the 
following: 
Ross automatic reversal: 1 x (-10) = -10 
Klat evidentiary hearing: 1 x [(-10)(0.5) + (0)(0.5)] = -5 
The equations reveal that a judge can expect a penalty of -10 where 
automatic reversal is the remedy for a competency stage deprivation. By 
contrast, a judge sitting in a circuit where an evidentiary hearing is the 
remedy used faces a penalty with a total expected payoff of -5.  
A harsher penalty, however, does not necessarily equate to a more effective 
penalty, and abstract quantification of different punishments says nothing 
about real-world effects. After all, for a difference in remedy to have any 
measurable deterrent impact, an implicit assumption is that a difference in 
remedy will influence judicial decisionmaking. While this may seem like an 
 
184 See John W. Heiderscheit III, Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions in the Ninth Circuit: The Collapse 
of the Deterrence Goal, 68 OR. L. REV. 57, 66-67 (1989) (explaining how Rule 37 sanctions deter 
bad behavior at trial depending on how the litigants perceive the likelihood and severity of 
potential punishments). The phrase “full set of considerations” here does not, nor should it, 
account for the political, personal, or other outside considerations of judges. If these considera-
tions do consciously play a role in a particular judge’s decisionmaking, such a variable would be 
difficult to model and even more difficult to justify.  
185 Id. at 67 n.52 (describing the considerations for a litigant facing possible sanctions as LP x 
SP = EP, where LP is the likelihood of punishment). 
186 In practice, this figure will vary depending on a host of factors including the particular 
appellate court, the reviewing judge, and case-specific facts. Regardless of the actual likelihood of a 
reversal in each case, the point remains that evidentiary hearings introduce uncertainty that makes 
appellate review less effective at serving deterrent goals.  
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unrealistic assumption to some, Kahneman and Tverksy’s prospect theory 
would predict systematic deviation in judicial decisionmaking as a function 
of the remedies available for error.187 Some may argue that judges are 
different and their cognitive psychology should not be analyzed using the 
same behavioral models derived from lay intuitions. If judges are individuals 
like the rest of us, however, then prospect theory has explanatory power.  
Prospect theory describes human decisionmaking under risk. The 
fundamental insight of the theory is that “individuals tend to value losses 
more heavily than gains of the same magnitude.”188 For example: 
[I]f a person is given a choice between a 70% shot at $100 or a certain award 
of $70 [a gain], he will normally choose the certain $70. On the other hand, 
if forced to choose between paying a $70 fee or taking a 70% chance of having 
to pay a $100 fee [a loss], he will normally choose to gamble and face the 
70% chance of paying the $100 fee.189 
The above study, and countless others like it, conclude that individuals are 
risk-seeking for losses but risk-averse for gains.190 Naturally, a host of 
implications flow from this insight, one of which is particularly helpful to 
the current discussion of a remedy’s deterrent power: the certainty effect. 
Through an analysis of the certainty effect, Ross automatic reversals are 
shown to be more effective at deterring judges from presiding over compe-
tency stage deprivations. From a behavioral perspective, therefore, automatic 
reversals are preferable to evidentiary hearings if a greater number of future 
defendants are to receive their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.  
1. The Certainty Effect 
Automatic reversals would deter judges more effectively because their 
punitive effect is unambiguous. Evidentiary hearings, by contrast, introduce 
uncertainty and threaten only a probabilistic punishment. Prospect theory’s 
certainty effect can help explain this difference. The certainty effect is 
derivable directly from prospect theory’s fundamental premise. Because 
 
187 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (articulating prospect theory and its implications for 
the first time).  
188 Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119 
(2003); see also Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 187, at 279 (“The aggravation that one experiences 
in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same 
amount.”). 
189 Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Litigation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 587, 589 
n.11 (2005). 
190 Id. at 589.  
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losses loom larger than gains, “responses to uncertain situations appear to 
have an all or none characteristic that is sensitive to the possibility rather 
than the probability of strong positive or negative consequences, causing 
very small probabilities to carry great weight.”191 Put differently, when 
individuals are forced to make decisions under the risk of deciding incor-
rectly, they systematically “overweigh[] outcomes that are considered 
certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable.”192 The certainty 
effect is most powerful when an individual’s decision is accompanied by 
“anticipatory emotions” such as fear, anxiety, and dread.193 
Applying prospect theory and its certainty effect reveals why the Ross 
approach deters constitutional violations better than the Klat approach. The 
difference is rooted in the uncertainty created by evidentiary hearings 
carrying only a chance of reversal, which contrasts starkly with the certainty 
provided by automatic reversal. Although an automatic reversal and an 
evidentiary hearing can yield the same penalty (reversal), the latter 
introduces variability into the deterrence calculus. A trial court judge, 
presiding over a competency hearing for a criminal defendant otherwise 
proceeding pro se, is more likely to ensure that the defendant’s competence 
is subject to meaningful adversarial testing when the threat of an automatic 
reversal is available to the reviewing judge. 
The certainty effect may cause a judge who is “pretty sure” of precedent 
governing self-representation at competency hearings to invest more time 
and effort into knowing the law if automatic reversal is available.194 For 
example, in a cognitive study, lawyers were more willing to pay for discovery 
information that would increase their chances of winning from 95% to 100% 
than they were for information increasing their chances of winning from 
25% to 30%.195 Normatively, individuals should be willing to pay the same 
amount for the discovery information in both cases because the difference 
made by the information is 5% in each case. Descriptively, however, 
 
191 Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, 
Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 318 (2004) (emphasis removed). 
192 Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
241, 283 (2006). 
193 See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267-68 
(2001).  
194 See Richard Birke, Commentary, Settlement Psychology: When Decision-Making Processes 
Fail, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 203, 215 (2000) (applying the certainty effect to 
the behavior of lawyers in the discovery process).  
195 Id.  
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individuals are systematically willing to pay a premium to avoid uncertain-
ty.196 But how does this reasoning apply to the current question of remedy? 
The argument goes as follows: if an automatic reversal (a certain penalty) 
awaits a trial judge unless he ensures that a defendant is represented at his 
competency hearing, the certainty effect predicts that he will be much more 
likely to take steps to avoid error. By contrast, if an evidentiary hearing 
were the sole remedy available for error, the certainty effect predicts that a 
judge may be less likely to invest the time and research necessary to 
understand the nuances of the law and ensure that even stand-by counsel 
provides a meaningful adversarial testing. Just like individuals in cognitive 
studies, busy trial judges are presumably risk-seeking when faced with the 
prospect of a loss in the form of a remand. The threat of a loss, therefore, 
should incentivize judges to take the steps necessary to reduce their expo-
sure to remand. The uncertainty introduced by evidentiary hearings makes 
the remedy less of a cognizable loss, however, and therefore the remedy is 
less effective at deterring judicial missteps. This result should remain 
observable even where a judge faces either automatic reversal (100% chance 
of loss) or an evidentiary hearing with a resulting 99% chance of reversal.197 
Indeed, the power of the certainty effect is that even this seemingly 
miniscule difference in probability can lead to systematic behavioral devia-
tion. As a result, the risk premium paid by judges—time and effort, for 
purposes of this analysis—is more likely to be invested where a certain 
penalty hangs in the balance. Automatic reversal provides this certainty, and 
deterrence of judicial error is more likely to follow from the Ross approach.  
2. Criticisms of Deterrence-Based Reasoning in this Context 
Certain questions can be raised regarding the efficacy of deterrence-
based strategies where judges are the intended audience. First, if an appel-
late remand is to deter subsequent violations by trial court judges, three 
prerequisites must be satisfied: the judge must know the new standard, he 
must perceive the cost of violation to be greater than the perceived benefit 
of misfeasance or malfeasance, “and he must be able and willing to bring 
 
196 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 187, at 265 (noting that “people overweight 
outcomes that are considered certain”); see also Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Market Volatility: Causes and 
Consequences, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 956 (1989) (explaining that investors require increasing 
“risk premiums” to invest in volatile opportunities); Note, supra note 189, at 592 (“A risk-seeking 
plaintiff[’s] . . . greater willingness to go to trial means that the defendant must pay him a risk 
premium above the expected value . . . to induce him to settle.”).  
197 The probability of reversal of the hearing could be this high, hypothetically, for a variety 
of case-specific reasons.  
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such knowledge to bear on his conduct decision at the time of the 
offense.”198 The absence of even one of these preconditions undermines 
deterrent goals within the criminal law context.199 Application of these 
preconditions to the context of appellate review, however, reveals that 
judges, perhaps even more than lawyers or other sophisticated parties, are 
good targets for deterrence-based strategies. Expecting a judge to 
understand new precedent, to rationally calculate, and to conform his 
decisions accordingly does not seem unrealistic. In this regard, automatic 
reversal, as opposed to an evidentiary hearing, is the penalty more likely to 
deter a rationally calculating judge from allowing a defendant to proceed 
unrepresented during his competency hearing. Although automatically 
reversing a defendant’s conviction and sentence based on this judicial error 
is more severe, the result is also more likely to motivate other judges to 
become aware of the standard and adjust their behavior accordingly—a 
general deterrent effect.  
Second, when taken in isolation, the above deterrence analysis is far too 
simplistic. One could argue that solely comparing the deterrent potential of 
various remedies simply leads to choosing the penalty that is the harshest in 
every case. In a system concerned only with deterrence, therefore, serious 
punishment could be appropriate for a judge allowing a defendant to 
proceed unrepresented during his competency hearing. This result should 
seem ridiculous to most readers, however, and for good reason. Analyzing a 
remedy through a one-dimensional deterrence analysis ignores considera-
tions of morality and proportionality that are important to most individu-
als.200 While choosing a harsh penalty like jail time might better prevent 
judicial error in more cases, effective deterrence might come at the cost of 
the justice system’s credibility and legitimacy.201  
 
198 Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra note 180, at 953 (discussing the prerequisites that must be 
satisfied for criminal law to effectively deter potential violators).  
199 Id. at 953-56 (discussing how deterrence is undermined by violator’s lack of knowledge of 
the law, inaccurate perception of the cost of violating rules, and inability to make rational 
decisions).  
200 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, 
and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 149 (2008) (explaining that social science experiments 
reveal that concepts of blameworthiness and justice strongly influence community intuitions about 
desert); Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1434-39, 1444-46, 1450-54 (2001) (exploring issues of 
proportionality and justice in a criminal law system that increasingly emphasizes preventive 
detention).  
201 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 98 (3d ed. 
2012) (“Thus, the criminal law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control, and is 
enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is perceived as ‘doing justice’ . . . .”). 
  
318 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 283 
 
Again, however, this general critique of deterrence seems to be less 
applicable to the current analysis of remedies. First, as the Ross court stated, 
the “established rule [is] that complete deprivation of counsel during a 
critical stage warrants automatic reversal without consideration of 
prejudice.”202 With the Supreme Court developing critical stage doctrine 
and reaffirming its requirements over decades of jurisprudence, the argu-
ment that automatic reversal is unnecessarily draconian or unprecedented is 
not credible. First, granting an automatic reversal in such cases falls well 
within the established lines of proportionality and legitimacy established by 
this nation’s highest court. Second, both the Ross and Klat approaches 
feature reversal as at least one of the remedies available when a defendant is 
unrepresented at his competency hearing. Both approaches, therefore, 
implicitly acknowledge that reversal is an appropriate remedy under at least 
some circumstances. The argument in favor of one or the other simply 
revolves around whether reversal should be automatic or come after an 
evidentiary hearing—a debate that belongs more within the rules versus 
standards paradigm, not a desert paradigm.203 Automatic reversal is the 
established remedy for a deprivation of counsel at a “critical stage,” so 
characterizing reversal as unnecessarily harsh to accomplish judicial deter-
rence in the competency hearing context is indefensible. Absent a global 
critique calling for the complete end to reversals, both Klat and Ross seem 
legitimate from a proportionality perspective. 
Finally, the most damning critique of deterrence-based justifications for 
automatic reversal questions whether individual judges, operating within a 
larger federal court system, can even be deterred at all. This critique, rooted 
in what I will refer to as “organizational theory,” attacks the fundamental 
premise that individuals can be effectively deterred under the right condi-
tions. Organizational theory  
criticizes rational choice theory for ignoring the impact organizations play 
in influencing individual actions. According to this account, the structure 
and culture of an institution frame . . . the situation for its agents, such 
that they are no longer acting as isolated rational individuals, engaging in a 
rational actor calculus. Instead, they function as part of a larger structure, 
absorbed in a larger cause, with the result that the organization’s rationality—
its goals and means—dominates in a way that may escape the attention of any 
one individual. This process can then create a recipe for organizational 
 
202 United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2012).  
203 For more on the competing benefits and limitations of rules and standards, see generally 
Korobkin, supra note 165, and Kaplow, supra note 165. 
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wrongdoing that will never trouble the conscience of anyone within the 
organization.204 
If organizational norms and standards truly shape the decisions of individual 
judges in the same way that they allegedly limit the discretion of police 
officers,205 for example, then a deterrence-based theory focused on individual 
judges is misguided. Instead, under organizational theory, cultural and 
“structural change” of the court system as a whole is required before any 
individual judge can be deterred.206 
Organizational theory, however, is not nearly as accepted as the competing 
theory of “methodological individualism.”207 Methodological individualism 
holds that “[i]nstitutions composed of individuals will only behave rationally, 
that is, will only adopt optimal means of achieving their goals, if such 
behavior results from the separate, self-interested behaviors of the people 
who comprise them.”208 This view of organizations as being reducible to the 
level of the individual is “even more foundational to law and economics than 
the rationality assumption, serving as a kind of framing constraint, rather 
than simply an assumption.”209 While neither theory can be definitively 
proven, methodological individualism’s appeal stems from a number of 
epistemological advantages over organizational theory. First, methodological 
individualism is more consistent with one’s everyday experience, allowing for 
a more intuitive explanation and avoiding metaphorical statements.210 
Second, unlike organizational theory, methodological individualism “gener-
ates testable hypotheses” regarding individual behavior and preferences.211 
For example, identifying a particular judge as “conservative” is testable, 
while classifying an entire court as “conservative” is a more complex task 
 
204 Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 821, 832-34 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
205 See id.; see also Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 512-13 (2004) (claiming that informal police force norms create organizational 
control over the range of discretion of individual officers). 
206 See Kinports, supra note 204, at 834 (arguing that, in the context of police behavior, the 
exclusionary rule could only serve as a deterrent if it spoke to police culture and created structural 
change); see also Armacost, supra note 205, at 509-10, 528 (opining that “systemic” remedies are 
needed to deter police misconduct, rather than “individual-specific” solutions).  
207 See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
537, 539 (1998) (defining methodological individualism as “the assumption that individuals are the 
only agents of human action”); Jason Scott Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-Realist Explanation, 
24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1217, 1244 (1990) (“Even the most superficially functional economic 
analysts of law ultimately adopt a methodological individualist research program . . . .”).  
208 Edward Rubin, Commentary, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1436 (1997).  
209 Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43, 45 (2011). 
210 See Rubin, supra note 208, at 1436.  
211 Id.  
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which requires an analysis of the preferences of individual judges anyway—
just less directly. Finally, methodological individualism focuses its analysis 
on the point where the “human experience occurs,” instead of requiring an 
abstraction to a higher order.212 Therefore, while one might question the 
ability of appellate review to deter judges from violating the constitutional 
rights of future defendants, that criticism should not lead to a recommenda-
tion that entire courts should be deterred instead. Individual judges make 
decisions, and therefore individual judges have the power to ensure that a 
defendant is not deprived of counsel at his competency hearing. Automati-
cally reversing a conviction and sentence—entered after a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated—is the most effective and efficient means 
to prevent future constitutional violations ex ante. If one remedy, consistent 
with Supreme Court jurisprudence, has the ability to reduce constitutional 
violations, there is little reason to select a competing theory. In order to do 
justice efficiently, automatic reversal should be the uniform remedy in this 
context.  
V. CRITIQUING REVERSALS: EMPIRICAL DESERT  
AND CHILLING EFFECTS 
The preceding Part provided three separate, but related, justifications 
for automatic reversal after a competency stage deprivation. Whether 
contractual, practical, or behavioral reasoning is ultimately persuasive, 
automatic reversals are a superior remedy to evidentiary hearings. As the 
above discussion made clear, however, each justification is vulnerable to its 
own set of criticisms and concerns. This Part briefly sets forth more global 
criticisms of the use of automatic reversals, all of which apply to the remedy 
regardless of the justifications for its use. While the mere presence of a 
circuit split indicates that these competing concerns provide sufficient 
support for some courts to utilize evidentiary hearings, the following 
discussion aims to explain why that choice is misguided.  
A. Minimizing Long-Term Costs 
The first criticism of the use of automatic reversals is based in econom-
ics. Reversing a conviction, the argument goes, produces waste in the form 
 
212 See Ahdieh, supra note 209, at 82 n.235; see also Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors 
in Their Place: Economics and Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1717 (1998) 
(“[M]ethodological individualism is . . . the theoretically argued position that the human 
consciousness is the irreducible arena of experience.”).  
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of a squandered trial and its side effects.213 According to this line of 
reasoning, evidentiary hearings avoid unnecessary waste by distinguishing 
trials where an error was “harmless” from those in which a more serious 
error occurred. Of course, after the jury is empaneled, lawyers present their 
cases and the judge decides, denying that automatic reversals impose costs is 
an untenable position. While reversals do impose short-term costs, relying 
on evidentiary hearings instead of reversals may increase long-term aggre-
gate costs. As the earlier discussion of deterrence explained, one of the 
advantages of automatic reversals is that the remedy may make the per-
ceived cost of future volitional behavior “exceed the advantage of the 
offence,”214 and “consequently bring about strong general preventive 
effects.”215 Instead of focusing on the immediate, measureable waste caused 
by automatic reversals in each case, “deterrence focuses forward on the 
prevention of future misconduct.”216 Therefore, while there is no objective 
measure of deterrence, it is quite possible—I argue probable—that choosing 
to automatically reverse after competency stage deprivations will decrease 
the long-term drain on judicial resources and burden on society. Although 
reversing in individual cases may be hard to swallow, particularly where the 
defendant is extremely dislikable or the crime especially heinous, the 
deterrent potential of reversal may lead to an overall reduction in the 
number of Ross/Klat-type cases.  
B. Empirical Desert and Systematic Credibility 
A second criticism of automatic reversals focuses on the moral credibil-
ity of the criminal justice system. As proponents of the “empirical desert” 
theory of punishment urge, in order to be effective, punishment must be 
 
213 See, e.g., United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A]utomatic rever-
sal inflicts on the public the costs of a needless retrial and on other litigants the resulting delays.”); 
People v. Hall, 460 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Mich. 1990) (“To require automatic reversal of an otherwise 
valid conviction for an error which is harmless constitutes an inexcusable waste of judicial 
resources.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Gupta v. United States, 599 U.S. 905 (2010) 
(No. 09-711), 2009 WL 4882622, at *11 (“Such an automatic-reversal rule results in a waste of 
scarce judicial resources.”).  
214 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (C. K. Ogden, ed., Rich-
ard Hildreth, trans., 1931).  
215 See Andenaes, supra note 179, at 983; see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 
(2009) (“[T]he benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 910 (1984) (explaining that, in the context of the exclusionary rule, the increased deterrence 
that may come from a broader application of the rule may not outweigh the costs imposed).  
216 Kinports, supra note 204, at 854.  
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“consistent with the community’s views about what constitutes justice.”217 
Community views are important because, if consistent with these views, 
“the law gains access to the power and efficiency of stigmatisation[,] . . . gains 
compliance by prompting people to defer to it as a moral authority in new 
or grey areas[,] . . . and it earns the ability to help shape of [sic] powerful 
influence of societal norms.”218 Like deterrence, choosing punishments that 
calibrate with empirical desert can help “to minimize future crime.”219 
Unlike purely deterrence-based punishments, though, morally credible 
punishments can add to the overall credibility of the criminal justice system 
and discourage discontent.220 So where does automatic reversal fall? 
The moral criticism of automatic reversals is that all defendants 
deprived of counsel are treated the same under the remedy. No distinction 
is made between the remorseful defendant with a history of mental illness 
and the sadistic serial killer—if deprived of counsel at their competency 
hearings, both will have their convictions reversed. Yet, in a society where 
mental illness is widely misunderstood221 and the perception is that “the 
insanity plea defeats justice, discredits psychiatry, and enrages the pub-
lic,”222 reversing a verdict for any reason related to a defendant’s compe-
tence risks undermining the public credibility of the criminal justice system. 
While competency stage deprivations focus on a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, meaning that any comparison with the 
insanity defense is misguided, public perception that the two are inter-
changeable may be important to the criminal justice system, even if 
inaccurate.  
By protecting the constitutional rights of even the most distasteful 
defendants, however, automatic reversals can powerfully demonstrate the 
 
217 See Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empiri-
cal, supra note 200, at 167.  
218 Id. at 149-50. 
219 Id. at 166. 
220 Id. at 153-54. 
221 See Karin A. Guiduli, Challenges for the Mentally Ill: The “Threat to Safety” Defense Standard 
and the Use of Psychotropic Medication Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1996) (“[T]he hidden and misunderstood nature of mental illness 
contributes to suspicion and disbelief that does not exist for physical disabilities. Lurking behind a 
diagnosis is the ‘myth of mental illness.’” (quoting THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS (1974))). 
222 WILLIAM J. WINSDALE & JUDITH WILSON ROSS, THE INSANITY PLEA 20 (1983); 
see also CAL. COMM’N FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, TO THE LEGISLATURE 16-17 
(1927) (“An even more serious fault of the present system is that a defendant . . . [can] bring into 
the case the whole matter of his sanity . . . . This enables him to submit to the jury great masses of 
evidence having no bearing upon the question . . . .”).  
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system’s legitimacy.223 Instead of placing “the protection of our most 
precious . . . constitutional rights . . . in the tumultuous tides of public 
misperception,”224 reversals do not make constitutional protections 
dependent on popular opinion. Some guilty defendants might benefit from 
their competency stage deprivations, but it is “a fundamental value determi-
nation of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to 
let a guilty man go free.”225 The Constitution is not discretionary, and its 
protections apply to all.  
Even if allowing community intuitions to determine appellate remedies 
is not a sufficiently alarming idea, the justifications for doing so have little 
force here. No doubt empirical desert is at its most powerful within the 
context of traditional criminal law, where punishment rules like the grading 
of attempts can be made to neatly map onto community intuitions of 
justice.226 But the dangers of vigilantism and noncompliance—two justifica-
tions often offered for prioritizing empirical desert—are much less of a 
threat when the “community” receiving punishment is the federal judiciary. 
In this setting, even if automatic reversals are viewed as disproportionate or 
arbitrary, this perception is likely only to increase the remedy’s deterrent 
effect. Without moral or theoretical support to stand on, the empirical 
desert critique of automatic reversals falls flat.  
C. Chilling Effect on Competency Hearings 
The last global critique of automatic reversals is practical. Its implica-
tions are concerning. If reversal follows every competency stage deprivation, 
the remedy could lead to a chilling effect on competency hearings 
themselves. As the Ross dissent argued, if raising any sort of questions 
 
223 See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views 
About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 723 (2000) (“The legitimacy of authorities is an especially promising 
basis for the rule of law . . . . [A]uthorities . . . are required to make unpopular decisions, which 
may deliver unfavorable outcomes.”). However, many scholars maintain that if legitimacy and 
moral credibility conflict, the latter should be chosen. See, e.g., Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, 
Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral 
Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 283 (2012) (“Sometimes, legitimacy is to be priori-
tized. More often, we think moral credibility is the superior value.”). 
224 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 219 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).  
225 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
226 See, e.g., Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1522 (1964) 
(“Section 110.05 . . . drops the penalty [for attempt] ‘only one notch below that of the crime 
attempted.’” (citation omitted)). But cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985) (“Except as 
otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same 
grade and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted . . . .”).  
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regarding a defendant’s competence can create a minefield, “a trial judge 
may well be understandably reluctant—especially in marginal cases—to 
have any type of proceeding focusing on a defendant’s competence.”227 
According to this critique, a trial judge will rationally avoid holding any 
additional hearings, even where a defendant’s competence is questionable, 
because appellate courts are much “more reluctant to reverse a sub silentio 
holding that no further inquiry was necessary.”228 Therefore, automatic 
reversals have the potential to harm defendants that are truly incompetent 
while undermining the overall accuracy of trials.229 
Even the Ross majority acknowledged the legitimate concerns raised by 
this critique. As that court stated: 
[W]e note that the prosecutor was expressly (and commendably) attempting 
to protect the record against this very result through the two motions for 
competency hearings. We do not wish to discourage motions for or grants 
of competency hearings when the matter is in any doubt but instead seek to 
provide guidance on the constitutional and statutory requirements to be 
followed so that hearings at this critical stage are not empty formalities but 
are meaningful adversarial determinations that generate a record sufficient 
for appropriate review on appeal.230 
This response connects with one of the affirmative arguments of this 
Comment. The purpose of punishment, generally, is to “announc[e] certain 
standards of behavior and attach[] penalties for deviation.”231 By attaching 
automatic reversals to competency stage deprivations, judges are able to 
make decisions with a clear and easy-to-understand penalty in the back-
ground. Unlike evidentiary hearings, automatic reversals announce exactly 
what punishment will follow each violation, which should encourage 
rational calculation. This clarity assuages the effects of uncertainty and 
disincentivizes the strategic behavior that uncertainty motivates.  
In addition, there would be little threat of a chilling effect because the 
new standard imposed on courts is not vague, difficult to understand, or 
different from previous requirements. The rule is simple: “a defendant 
 
227 United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 887 (6th Cir. 2012) (Boggs, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
228 Id.  
229 See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at 
the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 (2007) (“[C]lose to 80% of pro se felony 
defendants were not ordered to undergo competency evaluations . . . .”).  
230 Ross, 703 F.3d at 874.  
231 Andenaes, supra note 179, at 981-83 (quoting H. L. A. HART, PROLEGOMENON TO 
THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT 21-22 (1960)).  
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[must] be represented by counsel at his own competency hearing, even if he 
has previously made a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”232 Courts 
will have two clear options to weigh: (1) ensure that the defendant is 
represented by counsel at his competency hearing or (2) have any subse-
quent verdict and sentence reversed automatically. These requirements are 
not draconian and compliance should not present a significant new hurdle 
for trial judges. After all, the right to counsel is not a new concept and is 
relevant at many points during a criminal trial. Regardless, the focus of this 
critique is not the choice between reversals or hearings; rather, the Sixth 
Amendment requirement itself is at the center of the discussion. Unless the 
argument is that only automatic reversals, not the threat of evidentiary 
hearings with possible reversal, will lead to a chilling effect, then neither of 
the remedies currently used completely avoids the threat of strategic 
behavior by judges. While automatic reversal may foster more anxiety in the 
judiciary, these effects must be weighed against its benefits. The benefits of 
automatic reversals win the day.  
CONCLUSION 
A criminal defendant may proceed pro se “unless his relinquishment of 
the right to counsel cannot be said to be knowing and intelligent.”233 This 
requirement asks if the defendant “knows what he is doing and [if] his 
choice is made with eyes open.”234 Competency hearings are the tool used to 
test his understanding. This is why every circuit to decide the issue has 
found it “contradictory to conclude that a defendant whose competency is 
reasonably in question could nevertheless knowingly and intelligently waive 
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”235 The consensus regarding this 
finding, however, disappears at the remedy stage. The two remedies used by 
this nation’s circuit courts, automatic reversals and evidentiary hearings for 
prejudice, lead to different results and provide different incentives. This 
Comment provides three different justifications for the use of automatic 
reversals—one contractual, one practical, and the last behavioral. From each 
of these perspectives, automatic reversal is more consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment’s history and purpose. When a criminal defendant chooses to 
 
232 Ross, 703 F.3d at 871.  
233 Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (No. 73-5772), 1974 
WL 186113, at *16-17.  
234 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (citing Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)). 
235 United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
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proceed pro se, the trial judge must “assume a protective role.”236 If the 
judge fails to do so at the competency stage, some alternative source of 
protection must exist as a backstop. To provide this form of pro se paternalism, 
automatic reversals should be used. The lives and liberties of future 
defendants depend on it.  
 
236 See Joshua L. Howard, Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let’s Clear the Air for the 
Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 856 (2001).  
